Austin was one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century. The William James Lectures presented Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts on a wide variety of philosophical problems. These talks became the classic How to Do Things with Words. For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes John L. How to Do Things with Books in Victorian. How to Do Things with Books in Victorian Britain reshapes our understanding of the interplay between words. How To Do Things With Words - Michael Johnson's Homepage. Waylon Lewis is raising funds for Things I would like to do with You. If you read my words and. This level includes the 'Things' ebook + HD digital desktop. P Ebook Pdf contains important information and a detailed explanation about Ebook Pdf, its contents of the package, names of things and what they do, setup, and. All Things for Good (eBook) by Thomas Watson in ePub. Set down in these words, 'according to His purpose.' Do work together for the best to the saints. ![]() Austin was one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century. The William James Lectures presented Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts on a wide variety of philosophical problems. These talks became the classic How to Do Things with Words. For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary. ![]() Students will find the new text clearer, and, at the same time, more faithful to the actual lectures. An appendix contains literal transcriptions of a number of marginal notes made by Austin but not included in the text. Comparison of the text with these annotations provides new dimensions to the study of Austin's work. I happened to run into Bill Bryson the other evening on a deserted street somewhere in Geneva. On impulse, as one does, I mugged him and stole his latest manuscript. It turned out to be a potted history of philosophy. Here's an extract for your delectation. Once upon a time, there was a philosopher called Frege, who had the interesting idea that language and logic were really, you know, pretty much the same thing. ![]() He invented predicate calculus, which was the best shot to date at making sense out I happened to run into Bill Bryson the other evening on a deserted street somewhere in Geneva. On impulse, as one does, I mugged him and stole his latest manuscript. It turned out to be a potted history of philosophy. Here's an extract for your delectation. Once upon a time, there was a philosopher called Frege, who had the interesting idea that language and logic were really, you know, pretty much the same thing. He invented predicate calculus, which was the best shot to date at making sense out of that particular approach. For example (this always comes up, for some reason), in English you might say 'John loves Mary', and in predicate calculus you would write it as love'(john', mary')You have two constants, john' representing John, and mary' representing Mary, and the predicate love' obtains between them. Some people, Bertrand Russell being a notable example, liked Frege's insight. They picked it up and improved it. And then, in 1921, a young Austrian called Ludwig Wittgenstein published the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which was meant to finish the job. Language, explained Wittgenstein, consisted of 'pictures', the predicate calculus expressions, which 'connected to the world'. I first came across the Tractatus when I was about 17, and I remember looking at it and trying to figure out how this connection was supposed to work. It didn't seem to be very clearly explained, and I wondered what I wasn't getting. But at the time, Wittgenstein thought he'd cracked the problems of philosophy. He retired, and did other things that were more fun. After a while, Wittgenstein started to have misgivings. Maybe it wasn't all about logic: in fact, language often doesn't seem to be logical at all. You could have told him that, right? But Great Philosophers prefer to work it out by themselves). He started compiling a huge quantity of notes, which were meant to outline a new theory. These eventually saw the light as the Philosophical Investigations, an impressive mess. Wittgenstein apologised 'for not writing a better book', but he managed to convince many of his colleagues that logic may not in fact be the right way to think about what language means. And so we get up to Austin, one of Wittgenstein's brightest students, who wrote How To Do Things With Words. He probably wasn't as inspired as his master, but he was certainly much better organised. One key insight immediately found favour. There are some ways of using words that do indeed seem to be about describing the world; but there are others that are about interacting with it. As Austin pointed out, when the Mayor says 'I now pronounce you man and wife', she isn't describing anything. She makes something happen by virtue of what she says. And, when you think a little more, you see that this is the top of a linguistic iceberg. 'Performatives', as Austin called them, are very common. It's not just marrying people: it's a bunch of other things, like making promises, or issuing threats, or asking questions. Austin suggested some more useful terms, which were also enthusiastically adopted, and now everyone in linguistics talks about locutionary acts, perlocutionary acts and illocutionary force. The standard example is someone asking 'Is there any salt?' The locutionary act is a question about the presence of salt, but the perlocutionary act is causing somebody to hand you the salt. The illocutionary force is a command to give you salt. Austin had a bright student of his own, called Searle, and Searle took the ideas further. He wrote a book called Speech Acts, where he described different kinds of illocutionary acts. And then Searle had a student called Vanderveken, and together they developed a framework for writing down speech acts as formulas, in a new framework they called illocutionary logic.So, in three academic generations, linguistic philosophers had found their way back to logic again, just a different kind of logic. I wonder why this doesn't leave me feeling happier? Austin is seldom read, but his ideas of performative language and speech-act theory have been very influential. I had a writing professor that would drive me nuts as he would discuss whether something was felicitous or infelicitous. I now know where he got this terminology. Austin is the one who came up with the idea of felicitous and infelicitous argument. It would be nice to be able to view the world as either happy or sad. I am not sure that the binary of felicitous and infelicitous actually Austin is seldom read, but his ideas of performative language and speech-act theory have been very influential. I had a writing professor that would drive me nuts as he would discuss whether something was felicitous or infelicitous. I now know where he got this terminology. Austin is the one who came up with the idea of felicitous and infelicitous argument. It would be nice to be able to view the world as either happy or sad. I am not sure that the binary of felicitous and infelicitous actually works in the world, but I like the way that he describes this binary as workings. This book includes lectures that he gave at Berkley. In my rhetoric class, we had a great discussion about how he would view Facebook and updating statuses. I love his references to cats (although I am not sure why I do). I do things with words. Dark, terrible things. Okay, now that the joke's out of the way, may I say that I enjoyed this book of rather heady philosophy quite thoroughly? Which isn't to say that I skipped through it merrily like a prodigy--it took quite a bit of slow reading, and reading aloud, and flipping back to reread, and plenty of taking chapter endnotes, and marginalia to darken the edges, but you know what? I was surprised how often my notes were just smiley faces, or 'hmm' or cheery acknow I do things with words. Dark, terrible things. Okay, now that the joke's out of the way, may I say that I enjoyed this book of rather heady philosophy quite thoroughly? Which isn't to say that I skipped through it merrily like a prodigy--it took quite a bit of slow reading, and reading aloud, and flipping back to reread, and plenty of taking chapter endnotes, and marginalia to darken the edges, but you know what? I was surprised how often my notes were just smiley faces, or 'hmm' or cheery acknowledgment of 1955 slang (actually, probably older than that,adjusting for how hip and with-it Austin probably was, 'cock a snook' being my personal favorite expression.). Lots of Aristotelian classification, and a surprise twist for the last two chapters where he returns to his premises and (ugh, I hate the word) deconstructs them. Brain hurts a little and I'll probably feel like a doofus writing some sort of intelligent response on it for my continentalist professor tomorrow, but I appreciate Austin's good humor and deep thinking. Just finished reading this again, for the nth time, for class tomorrow. I love this book, but it really could be 40 pages long. -------- (September 3, 2010) Rereading this, I was most struck by (1) how absurdly funny and delightful Austin's prose is ('a specialist in the sui generis'; 'we can insincerely promise to give a donkey a carrot', 'we may seem to have armed ourselves with two shiny new concepts with which to crack the crib of Reality', etc. Etc.), and yet (2) how weirdly legalistic most of Just finished reading this again, for the nth time, for class tomorrow. I love this book, but it really could be 40 pages long. -------- (September 3, 2010) Rereading this, I was most struck by (1) how absurdly funny and delightful Austin's prose is ('a specialist in the sui generis'; 'we can insincerely promise to give a donkey a carrot', 'we may seem to have armed ourselves with two shiny new concepts with which to crack the crib of Reality', etc. Etc.), and yet (2) how weirdly legalistic most of this book is. And I'm left really wishing that Austin would have given an example illustrating how 'the truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances'. Obviously the truth of a statement depends on the circumstances, but how does the truth of a statement depend on what act you were performing? Moreover, he says a statement IS a kind of (illocutionary) act, so how could the truth of an act depend on what act you were performing with it? Attracted as I am to the charming circularity of sentences that 'do' what they 'say', austin loses me as early as p.9 with 'I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem.' Will this theory of speech that cannot take jokes or poetry into account ever get beyond the most banal utterances of an honest-to-goodness man-of-his-word? Then there is all the talk about war, sports, giving orders and shooting donkeys-- reading this book feels a lot like being bullied into accepting some rather dubi attracted as I am to the charming circularity of sentences that 'do' what they 'say', austin loses me as early as p.9 with 'I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem.' Will this theory of speech that cannot take jokes or poetry into account ever get beyond the most banal utterances of an honest-to-goodness man-of-his-word? Then there is all the talk about war, sports, giving orders and shooting donkeys-- reading this book feels a lot like being bullied into accepting some rather dubious assumptions about causality in speech. I declare a thumb war. Another one of these analytic-tradition writers I've become quite fascinated with that have still left an indelible imprint on the continentals. While working within the same, precise and cut-and-dried tradition as Frege and Russell, he still is able to make a radical proposition, that of the speech act. Language is not just a code, it is an activity and needs to be treated as such. Our words for things are grounded in social and cultural realities, and their definitions are based on Another one of these analytic-tradition writers I've become quite fascinated with that have still left an indelible imprint on the continentals. While working within the same, precise and cut-and-dried tradition as Frege and Russell, he still is able to make a radical proposition, that of the speech act. Language is not just a code, it is an activity and needs to be treated as such. Our words for things are grounded in social and cultural realities, and their definitions are based on socially generated acceptable meanings. Sentences are neither true nor false, they fit in with their contexts. These are things that make intuitive sense to you and me, but not to Frege. Austin's specifics are a lot more complex and subtle, but if you care at all about the words you use-- and I care a lot, probably too much-- you'll find something to appreciate here. This is a well composed look at a linguistic pseudo-system. I picked this up after reading the first chapter of 'Truth in Painting,' and wanted a bit more guidance than that found on Wikepedia concerning performatives. It looks like there are a number of pans below, and I can't really reason why. The book was compiled from lecture notes and was never fully edited or revised. What we get is the knotted thread of a philosophical investigation in which some knots have been loosened and some have be This is a well composed look at a linguistic pseudo-system. I picked this up after reading the first chapter of 'Truth in Painting,' and wanted a bit more guidance than that found on Wikepedia concerning performatives. It looks like there are a number of pans below, and I can't really reason why. The book was compiled from lecture notes and was never fully edited or revised. What we get is the knotted thread of a philosophical investigation in which some knots have been loosened and some have been passed over altogether. There are some very insightful 'verb tools,' loads of examples, and not one hammered nail.nothing to really poo-poo. Not a polished work, but full of instruction, humor and idea. On to Derrida. Austin has been critisized by many philosophers for not being philosophical enough, and as much as I can see their point I have to defend Austin. At the point that Austin gave these lectures anglo-american philosophy was full of so much nonsense - largely due to Frege's bizarre vocabulary (or possibly bad translations) and Russell ridiculous mathematical approach to things that just don't fit into equations. I don't think that this book is of a very high philosophical content, but I think that ph Austin has been critisized by many philosophers for not being philosophical enough, and as much as I can see their point I have to defend Austin. At the point that Austin gave these lectures anglo-american philosophy was full of so much nonsense - largely due to Frege's bizarre vocabulary (or possibly bad translations) and Russell ridiculous mathematical approach to things that just don't fit into equations. I don't think that this book is of a very high philosophical content, but I think that philosophy has benefited - with the help of Searle - from Austin's theoretically linguistic approach. Also this is one of the more enjoyable reads in the world of modern philosophy if a bit pedantic. This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, Speech utterances: The difference between describing something by saying something (constatives), and doing something via saying something (performatives). In the case of the latter, to speak is also to act - as in to change something about the world: 'I do take this woman/man to be my lawfully wedded wife/husband', 'I promise that I will be there tonight', 'get out of the way, that bull is dangerous!' Note that to do something via speaking may also involve actions - such as the exchanging of ri Speech utterances: The difference between describing something by saying something (constatives), and doing something via saying something (performatives). In the case of the latter, to speak is also to act - as in to change something about the world: 'I do take this woman/man to be my lawfully wedded wife/husband', 'I promise that I will be there tonight', 'get out of the way, that bull is dangerous!' Note that to do something via speaking may also involve actions - such as the exchanging of rings in the example of marriage. The former, which is the descriptive utterance, is distinguished from the performative in so far as nothing is changed about the world via its utterance: 'the grass is green', 'today is Tuesday', 'the lightbulb has blown'. As shall be seen though, there can be cases of crossovers between the two - ultimately requiring a new conceptual model comprised of three parts: 'locution, illocution and perlocution'(end of ch.8 onwards, book has 12 chapters). Fundamentally (from the revised conceptual model), the point of importance I took away from the dialectic, is that to speak is to in all cases to act in some way. That is, to provide a pithy summary, 'our word is our bond' - there is accountability for that which we say: like with the promise. - Austin's work is presented in the form of lecture notes posthumously edited and published - A relevant lecture of his can be found on YouTube under the title: 'J. Austin Lecture in Sweden (1959) part one', or via this link. A slim but challenging volume. Per its catchy title, the book is a sketch investigation (in the form of a series of lectures that were delivered at Harvard in 1955) of certain performative aspects of language which problematized the then paradigmatic view that all utterances (at least many more than you might suppose) may be analysed, qua simple statements, as true or false. It's no wonder these lectures have been continuously reprinted since their initial publication. This book has all the hall A slim but challenging volume. Per its catchy title, the book is a sketch investigation (in the form of a series of lectures that were delivered at Harvard in 1955) of certain performative aspects of language which problematized the then paradigmatic view that all utterances (at least many more than you might suppose) may be analysed, qua simple statements, as true or false. It's no wonder these lectures have been continuously reprinted since their initial publication. This book has all the hallmarks of having achieved its classic status upon its release. It's a goddess sprung from a clamshell; night separated from day; turtles all the way down. It's enormously provocative -- even across the generations. What it is, and has been, above all, is a spur to reflection and further investigation. Though I had difficulty following certain of Austin's more abstruse contortions, I am the richer for having attempted them. I highly recommend this book to anyone who prizes language, reason, and argument. A delightful read. Based on a series of lectures at Harvard, Austin makes good on his chance to elucidate the dichotomy of constative (descriptive) vs. Performative utterances. And boy does he ever. Out of the 12, some lectures spend good time delineating categories, others waste time expanding those categories to their limits, but by the end Austin is ready to tell you something worthwhile--that the original dichotomy ought to be cast out. For it is only then that we can make an earnest stride A delightful read. Based on a series of lectures at Harvard, Austin makes good on his chance to elucidate the dichotomy of constative (descriptive) vs. Performative utterances. And boy does he ever. Out of the 12, some lectures spend good time delineating categories, others waste time expanding those categories to their limits, but by the end Austin is ready to tell you something worthwhile--that the original dichotomy ought to be cast out. For it is only then that we can make an earnest stride toward dispelling many philosophical 'problems' that are merely the result of misunderstandings. A quick, easy read (I'd say) and especially appealing to those continental-leaning, Ordinary Language Philosophy-loving brigands. A quote I liked: “But consider also for a moment whether the question of truth or falsity is so very objective. We ask: “Is it a fair statement?” and are the good reasons and good evidence for stating and saying so very different from the good reasons and evidence for performative acts like arguing, warning, and judging? Is the constative, then, always true or false? When a constative is confront with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with those that we use in the appraisal of performatives. Speech-act theory, which this work was the first to popularize, is fascinating. You may have learned in school that the purpose of statements are to state a fact (indicative), ask a question (interrogative), or express emotion (exclamatory). But what about statements that actually accomplish something? For example, when the parson says, 'I now declare you man and wife,' he isn't merely stating that they happen to be man and wife; he is making it so. The examples abound: christening a ship, deliv Speech-act theory, which this work was the first to popularize, is fascinating. You may have learned in school that the purpose of statements are to state a fact (indicative), ask a question (interrogative), or express emotion (exclamatory). But what about statements that actually accomplish something? For example, when the parson says, 'I now declare you man and wife,' he isn't merely stating that they happen to be man and wife; he is making it so. The examples abound: christening a ship, delivering a verdict, naming a baby, and so on and so forth. This is important for theology because so much of what God declares in the Bible falls into this category. So, this book had the opportunity to be great. But it's not. It's divided into 12 'lectures' (or chapters, but the material was first delivered orally), and honestly a good half of them are dithering remarks how you distinguish true speech-acts from other statements. But that's not the title of the book! I want to learn how to use them for full effect. Even the final few, better chapters are more about classification than use. He introduces the now-standard locution/illocution/perlocution distinction that was quite hazy in seminary but much clearer now. Locution: a statement with a particular meaning. Illocution: the force of those words. Perlocution: achieving certain effects by saying those words. So, for example, locution: 'That burner is hot.' Illocution: You probably shouldn't touch it. Perlocution: your husband's hand is safe. These distinctions are not always clear-cut, but it is helpful to keep them in mind when we discuss the import of various statements. In all, Austin writes that there are five types of statements/locutions. Verdictive: giving a verdict, estimate, appraisal, etc. ('You're guilty'; 'the batter is out'; 'I rule you out of order') 2. Exercitives: exercising powers, influence, etc. ('I appoint you chairman:' 'I warn you that bull is about to charge') 3. Commissives: promising or otherwise committing oneself ('I covenant with you'; 'I pledge twenty dollars') 4. Behabitives: addressing attitudes and social behavior ('I congratulate you'; 'I apologize') 5. Expositives: placing our other words into their proper arguments and conversations ('I concede'; 'I reply'; 'I swear') So, while all the classifications were interesting, I would have preferred more discussion of their usage and effects. This is an interesting book in that, it seems to me, you could read it as the beginning of something, the end of something, or the beginning of the end of something. It certainly seems like a significant contribution to the 'beginning' of speech-act theory, paving the way for Searle and others who have taken the looseness of Austin's proposed categories and self-deprecated 'programme' as evidence of the need for more careful categorization and systemization (164). It seems like the end of the road This is an interesting book in that, it seems to me, you could read it as the beginning of something, the end of something, or the beginning of the end of something. It certainly seems like a significant contribution to the 'beginning' of speech-act theory, paving the way for Searle and others who have taken the looseness of Austin's proposed categories and self-deprecated 'programme' as evidence of the need for more careful categorization and systemization (164). It seems like the end of the road for a number of earlier philosophical and linguistic distinctions, as well as the pipe dream of a perfect referential language. Austin's foregrounding of the rhetorical (a term he doesn't make much use of), situational nature of language makes it plain that an abstract, philosophically prescriptive is destined to be inadequate for everyday use: 'Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act' (139). And it's potentially the beginning of(/and?) the end of its own project, if you take the way Austin's categories constantly run together and deconstruct themselves not as evidence of insufficient theorizing, but as the performance of his explicit project's impossibility. As such, lines like these--'I must explain again that we are floundering here. To feel the firm ground of prejudice slipping away is exhilarating, but brings its revenges' (61), or 'It is inherent in the nature of any procedure that the limits of its applicability. Will remain vague' (31)--are not nods to the intellectual difficulty of the projects that might follow Austin's, but to the naivete and arbitrariness that would underlie any rigorous approach to speech-act theory. Which makes Austin more significant as the progenitor of Derrida's 'Limited Inc' rather than Searle's work. The last possibility is what interests me the most, and so--though I did read it carefully and attempt to avoid skimming--I remain persuaded by a friend's advice: 'It's not so important that you understand and remember his categories. What's important is the way they fall apart.' So my primary interest in Austin's book is not as a philosophical tract, but as (appropriately) a performative act. In this review I will summarize Austin's argument and end with some reflections and criticisms: Summary This is a primer in speech-act theory. Austin highlights the possibility of a category of speech in which statements are neither true, nor false, but performative. Some statements do things; more specifically, when spoken they create a new situation. In order to qualify as a performative, a statement must meet certain conditions (pp. 12ff; a statement must be made in good faith by someone who has In this review I will summarize Austin's argument and end with some reflections and criticisms: Summary This is a primer in speech-act theory. Austin highlights the possibility of a category of speech in which statements are neither true, nor false, but performative. Some statements do things; more specifically, when spoken they create a new situation. In order to qualify as a performative, a statement must meet certain conditions (pp. 12ff; a statement must be made in good faith by someone who has the authority to make it, etc.) and must be made within a horizon of convention: for example, we understand that a minister or a justice of the peace has the authority to create a married-status and not just any old person off of the street. One of Austin's strengths in this book is he is able to return to the main argument and sum up lines of thought (the weakness is his continuous getting off of topic. Here are three basic definitions which are crucial to his project. Locutionary Act: Uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference; equivalent to meaning (109). Perlocutionary Act: consequences of the act performed Illocution: the act performed; has a conventional force (109). Reflection So far, so good. Speech-act theory is rather simple in the broad contours, but as Austin demonstrates, it suffers the risk of a thousand qualifications. He then gets technical on how a promise/performative may be void, illicit, etc., and this runs for about 6 chapters. By the end the reader wonders, “Why bother?” Speech-Act theory is a useful way of describing events in our world. As such, I hold to it. If one tries to make it an architectonic theory, then it spins out of control, as Austin himself demonstrated (probably against his intentions). The main drawback with this book, as others have pointed out, is that Austin can't stay on topic for more than two paragraphs. In what is probably Austin's most widely-read work, comprising his annotated notes from a series of lectures, he proposes a tentative outline and some initial problems for a novel linguistic-philosophical theory which recognizes the fine gradations of use and interpretation to which linguistic acts are habitually subjected in normal discourse, and all of the ambiguities amongst them. In doing so, he concludes that the implicit performance of strictly non-linguistic acts is a pervasive aspect of In what is probably Austin's most widely-read work, comprising his annotated notes from a series of lectures, he proposes a tentative outline and some initial problems for a novel linguistic-philosophical theory which recognizes the fine gradations of use and interpretation to which linguistic acts are habitually subjected in normal discourse, and all of the ambiguities amongst them. In doing so, he concludes that the implicit performance of strictly non-linguistic acts is a pervasive aspect of language, more or less abstracted from the idealized generality of pure 'statement' in any particular instance. Implicit within his delineation of the conditions for a performative utterance's success - or, to use his terminology, its 'happiness' - is the assertion that the concomitant or subsequent state of social reality depends upon the validity of the use of words, rather than the reverse, and that this is an immediate causal relationship; the linguistic act per se instantiates the state of affairs. Despite his frequent methodical analyses of semantic distinctions and the 'infelicities' to which performative language is subject, Austin's writing conveys much of the engaging presence and personality which were no doubt present in his lectures. The work itself is an insightful reconsideration of how human communication is actually conducted, and how far its modes of expression extend beyond the binary of true and false statements. At many points, J.L. Austin's How to do Things with Words reads more like a linguistic textbook than a philosophy text. Whether you count this as a benifit or a distraction will depend on your disposition (it certainly beats reading Kant), but whatever your views on the subject, the work is a useful introduction to Speech Act Theory. How to do Things with Words examines a part of language that philosophy has traditionaly ignored, what he dubs the performative utterance. There are certain instanc At many points, J.L. Austin's How to do Things with Words reads more like a linguistic textbook than a philosophy text. Whether you count this as a benifit or a distraction will depend on your disposition (it certainly beats reading Kant), but whatever your views on the subject, the work is a useful introduction to Speech Act Theory. How to do Things with Words examines a part of language that philosophy has traditionaly ignored, what he dubs the performative utterance. There are certain instances in language where to say something is do perform the very act you say, promising being the perinial example. If I say, under ordinary circumstances, 'I promise to do x' then I have promised to do x. Using this seemingly magical fact as his starting point, Austin goes reach profound conclusions about the nature of language and philosophy. Though the tasks Austin sets out to accomplish are largely left uncompleted (he himself admits this) the book will give you the grounding you need to pursue other works in the field, such as those of Searle or Grice. Happy reading! By Thomas Watson in, & formats Christian Reader, There are two things, which I have always looked upon as difficult. The one is—to make the wicked sad; the other is—to make the godly joyful. Dejection in the godly arises from a double spring: either because their inward comforts are darkened, or their outward comforts are disturbed. To cure both these troubles, I have put forth this ensuing treatise, hoping, by the blessing of God, that it will buoy up their desponding hearts, and make them look with a more pleasant aspect. I would prescribe them to take, now and then, a little of this Cordial: 'all things work together for good to those who love God.' To know that nothing hurts the godly, is a matter of comfort; but to be assured that all things which fall out shall cooperate for their good, that their crosses shall be turned into blessings, that showers of affliction water the withering root of their grace and make it flourish more—this may fill their hearts with joy until they run over! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ If the whole Scripture be the feast for the soul (as Ambrose says)—then Romans 8 may be a dish at that feast, and with its sweet variety may very much refresh and animate the hearts of Gods people. In the preceding verses the apostle had been wading through the great doctrines of justification and adoption, mysteries so arduous and profound, that without the help and conduct of the Spirit, he might soon have waded beyond his depth. In this verse the apostle touches upon that pleasant string of consolation, 'we know that all things work together for good, to those who love God.' Not a word but is weighty; therefore I shall gather up every filing of this gold, that nothing will be lost. In the text there are three general branches. First, a glorious privilege. All things work for good. Second, the people interested in this privilege. They are doubly specified. They are lovers of God, they are called. Third, the origin and spring of this effectual calling, set down in these words, 'according to His purpose.' First, the glorious PRIVILEGE. Here are two things to be considered: 1. The certainty of the privilege—'We know.' The excellency of the privilege—'All things work together for good.' The CERTAINLY of the privilege: 'We know.' It is not a matter wavering or doubt. The apostle does not say, 'We hope, or conjecture.' 'We know that all things work for good.' Hence observe that the truths of the gospel are evident and infallible. A Christian may come not merely to a vague opinion, but to a certainty of what he holds. As axioms and aphorisms are evident to reason, so the truths of true religion are evident to faith. 'We know,' says the apostle. Though a Christian has not a perfect knowledge of the mysteries of the gospel—yet he has a certain knowledge. 'We see through a glass darkly' (1 Cor. X3:12), therefore we have not perfection of knowledge; but 'we behold with open face' (2 Cor. 3:18), therefore we have certainty. The Spirit of God imprints heavenly truths upon the heart, as with the point of a diamond. A Christian may know infallibly that there is an evil in sin, and a beauty in holiness. He may know that he is in the state of grace. 'We know that we have passed from death to life' (1 John 3:14). He may know that he shall go to heaven. 'We know that if our earthly tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens' (2 Cor. The Lord does not leave His people at uncertainties in matters of salvation. The apostle says, 'We know. We have arrived at a holy confidence. We have both the Spirit of God, and our own experience, setting seal to it.' Let us then not rest in skepticism or doubts—but labor to come to a certainty in the things of religion. As that martyr woman said, 'I cannot dispute for Christ—but I can burn for Christ.' God knows whether we may be called forth to be witnesses to His truth; therefore it concerns us to be well-grounded and confirmed in it. If we are doubting Christians, we shall be wavering Christians. Whence is apostasy, but from incredulity? Men first question the truth, and then fall from the truth. Oh, beg the Spirit of God, not only to anoint you, but to seal you (2 Cor. The EXCELLENCY of the privilege. 'All things work together for good.' This is as Jacob's staff in the hand of faith, with which we may walk cheerfully to the mount of God! What will satisfy or make us content, if this will not? All things work together for good. This expression 'work together' refers to medicine. Several poisonous ingredients put together, being tempered by the skill of the apothecary, make a sovereign medicine, and work together for the good of the patient. So all God's providences being divinely tempered and sanctified, do work together for the best to the saints. He who loves God and is called according to His purpose, may rest assured that everything in the world shall be for his good. This is a Christian's cordial, which may warm him—and make him like Jonathan who, when he had tasted the honey at the end of the rod, 'his eyes were enlightened' (1 Sam. Why should a Christian destroy himself? Why should he kill himself with care, when all things shall sweetly concur, yes, conspire for his good? The result of the text is this—all the various dealings of God with His children, do by a special providence turn to their good. 'All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth unto such as keep his covenant' (Psalm 25:10). If every path has mercy in it, then it works for good. We shall consider, first, WHAT things work for good to the godly; and here we shall show that both the best things and the worst things work for their good. We begin with the best things. Table of Contents Introduction The Bezt Things Work for God for the Godly The Worst Things Work for Good Why All Things Work for Good Of Love to God The Tests of Love to God An Exhortation to Love God Effectual Calling Exhortations to Them that are Called Concerning God's Purpose.
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